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TREBLE DAMAGES, DETERRENCE, AND THEIR
RELATION TO SUBSTANTIVE LAW: RAMIFICATIONS
OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984.
INTRODUCTION
The United States economy is founded in part on investor con-
fidence in and public perception of the fairness and integrity of the
nation's securities markets.' This foundation is partially being eroded
by what is commonly referred to as "insider trading."' The need to
1. This policy was an initial impetus when Congress enacted the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78a-78kk (1982), to deter abusive practices and
restore integrity in the national securities markets. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, 3-5 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3-5, 10-14 (1934); Note,
The Role of Treble Damages in Legislative and Judicial Attempts to Deter Insider Trading,
41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1069 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Role of Treble
Damages]; Note, CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton: The Seventh Circuit Lets the Insider
Off, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 247 (1983). Congress continues to advocate this policy. See H.R.
REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2274 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
2. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 3, 21. "Insider trading" is a term used
to refer to trading in the securities markets by "insiders" -corporate executives, of-
ficers or their employees-while in possession of material information not yet
disseminated to the general public. This term may also be extended to include per-
sons such as attorneys, accountants, underwriters, and other agents who, through their
positions of trust and confidence, become "temporary" insiders. See Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983); Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and
its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273 (1984). The term "insider trading"
is actually a misnomer because "insiders" may be "temporary" or "constructive" in-
siders, "trading" may be done by "tippees" of the insider who then trade, and the
information underlying an illegal trade may not be "inside" but rather external "market"
information not yet generally known, all of which reveals the difficulty in concluding
that insider trading is currently well defined. Report of the Task Force on Regulation
of Insider Trading Part I: Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 223, 224 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Task Force
Report].
There is evidence that the incidence of insider trading is very high and may
in fact be the most common violation of the federal securities laws. See Dooley, En-
forcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1980); Note, A Cri-
tique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 455, 455 (1985).
For a brief list of the vast literature dealing with the legal problem of insider
trading, see H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Carlton &
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Anderson,
Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341 (1982); Haft, The
Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982); Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3, and Dirks: "Fairness"
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regulate insider trading is an issue widely debated in economic and
legal theory.3 However, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and Congress share the view that regulation proscribing insider
trading is vital to principles of fairness and equity among market par-
ticipants since this information is material to the investment decision
process of all investors.'
One of the most elusive problems in curbing insider trading
abuses has been finding an effective means of deterrence. Until
recently, the SEC's enforcement remedies as a deterrent to insider
trading were primarily limited to criminal prosecutions' or civil ac-
tions seeking disgorgement of profits' and an injunction against future
violations.' In addition to the SEC's enforcement powers, deterrence
Versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982); Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5,
Disclosure and Corporate Privacy 9 J, LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980); Brudney, Insiders, Out-
siders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Law, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 322 (1979).
3. Economically, an "efficient" market is one where prices always fully reflect
available information, including inside information. Note, The Efficient Capital Market
Hypotheses, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 1031, 1073 (1977). Insider trading leads to market efficiency because such
trades move the market in the correct direction. H. MANNE, supra note 2. Therefore,
economic considerations do not justify restrictions on insider trading. Id. But cf.
Schotland, Unsafe at any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market,
53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967) (insider trading is inherently "unfair"); Brudney, supra note
2, at 345-46 (informational advantages obtained by insiders also rest on considerations
of equity).
4. See, e.g., Thomas, Insider Trading Revisited: The SEC's New Initiatives,
1982-1983 CORP. PRAC. COMM. 433, 435 (SEC's view); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at
2, 3, 21 (Congress adopting the SEC's view).
5. 15 U.S.C. S 78ff (1982). The SEC can refer criminal prosecution to the
United States Attorney General. Id. S 78u(d).
6. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. Several courts and commentators
have disagreed over the proper measure of the disgorgement remedy. See, e.g., SEC
v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d
156 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); Brunelle, Disgorgement
of Insider Trading Profits in SEC Injunctive Proceedings, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 371, 373
(1984); Note, The Role of Treble Damages, supra note 1, at 1072-74. One federal district
court has even denied the remedy because of its inadequacy as an effective deterrent
to insider trading. SEC v. Randolph, 564 F. Supp. 137, 140-41 (N.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd,
736 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1984).
7. 15 U.S.C. S 78u(d) (1982). To obtain an injunction, the SEC must present
proof of a past violation and a reasonable likelihood of future violations. See SEC v.
Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1978); HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 6.
There are other provisions by which the SEC can investigate and enforce
the insider trading prohibitions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1982) (discipline broker-
dealers); Id. § 78u(a) (investigative authority); Id. S 78ff (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (criminal
penalties).
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of insider trading by private plaintiffs has met with limited success
where courts have implied a private right of action! Despite efforts
from the SEC and the private sector, the remedies available did not
provide an effective deterrent to insider trading.'
In an effort to rectify the ineffectiveness of enforcement remedies
available to the SEC for insider trading violations, Congress enacted
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA).'° Congress designed
the ITSA to impose a severe monetary civil penalty as the primary
means of deterring future violations of insider trading." Under this
legislation, the SEC has the authority to seek and the courts have
the power to impose up to a maximum penalty of treble damages on
insider trading violations subject to the Act. 2 Before a sanction can
be imposed under the ITSA, courts must first find a violation of in-
sider trading as defined under substantive rules independent of the
ITSA, 13 such as section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).1 4 Once a violation is found, courts must
8. See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1275-77. An implied private right of ac-
tion under Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1985), was first recognized in Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947). This remedy was finally
recognized by the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375 (1983) (current Supreme Court recognition of this remedy).
9. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-8; Langevoort, supra note 2, at
1275-77; Note, supra note 2, at 455, 462, 468-69; Note, The Role of Treble Damages,
supra note 1, at 1071.
10. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. S§ 78a, 78c, 78o, 78t, 78u, 78ff (Supp. 11 1984))
[hereinafter cited as Exchange Act]. This provision amends The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
11. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
12. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at § 21(d)(2)(A). Whenever it appears to the
SEC that a person is in violation of the insider trading proscriptions, "[Tihe Commis-
sion may bring an action in a United States district court to seek, and the court shall
have the jurisdiction to impose, a civil penalty to be paid by such person. . . . The
amount of such penalty . . . shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss
avoided." Id. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
13. See Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A); HOUSE REPORT. supra
note 1, at 13-15, 31-33; Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hear-
ings on H.R. 559 Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,
and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 49, 56 (1983) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (testimony of Hon.
John S. R. Shad, Chairman, SEC and John M. Fedders, Director, Division of Enforce-
ment, SEC).
14. Section 10(b) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
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decide whether this violation triggers the "substantive" culpability
requirements of the ITSA. 5 If so, courts are to then determine the
measure of damages up to the treble damage maximum based on the
facts and circumstances of each case."6
With the treble damage penalty, Congress intended the ITSA
to be purely a sanction statute; it was not intended to modify in any
way the preexisting body of substantive insider trading law as
developed under Rule 10b-5 by court and administrative holdings. 7
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 10(b), 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1982).
Rule 10b-5, promulgated to allow enforcement of section 10(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or;
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1985).
There are other substantive rules which impose liability for insider trading.
For example, the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 which makes it unlawful for anyone other
than the bidder in a tender offer to trade based on material nonpublic information.
17 C.F.R. S 240.14e-3 (1985). Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act also imposes liability
for short-term trading profits based on inside information. 15 U.S.C. S 78p(b) (1982).
See also H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK SS 16.01-.02, 20.03-.04 (1984)
(discussing the application of section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, Rule 14e-3, and section 16(b)
and their relation to insider trading).
When discussing the substantive law of insider trading, for purposes of simplicity
this note will hereinafter refer primarily to Rule 10b-5 since most of the substantive
law regarding insider trading has developed under this rule.
15. See infra notes 32-111 and accompanying text.
16. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A). The Act provides: "The
amount of such penalty shall be determined by the court in light of the facts and
circumstances, but shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided as
a result of such unlawful purchase or sale .. " Id.
17. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13; House Hearings, supra note 13, at
49, 56; 130 CONG. REC. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984). See 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION
AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10b-5 S 265 (2d ed. 1985 rev.); Brodsky, Insider Trading
and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984: New Wine Into New Bottles?, 41 WASH.
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Prior to the ITSA's adoption, the issue of whether the ITSA should
expressly define insider trading was widely debated, but for several
reasons, inclusion of a definition of insider trading was ultimately
opposed? This extensive congressional consideration of prevailing in-
sider trading law and of specific proposals for definitional change is
critical. Under a cannon of statutory construction, when Congress is
aware of an opportunity to change prevailing judicial construction of
a prior enacted provision, for example Rule 10b-5, and has decided
not to do so, this inaction constitutes an implied endorsement of 1 he
prevailing judicial construction.'9
& LEE L. REV. 921, 922 (1984); Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1274; Note, supra note
2, at 455-56, 491, 496-97.
18. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, introduced under House bill
H.R. 559, was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce in the House of
Representatives which issued a report to accompany H.R. 559. HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 1. The Committee believed that any statutory definition would necessarily have
to be broad enough to encompass unforseen fact patterns and would result in a defini-
tion only slightly less ambiguous than current insider trading proscriptions developed
by the courts. Id. at 14. The Committee also feared that any definition would only
serve to increase litigation and legal uncertainty. Id. at 13, 32-33. The inability of the
drafters of the proposed American Law Institute Federal Securities Code to formulate
an adequate definition of insider trading also influenced the Committee. Id. at 13-14.
See also Block & Barton, Insider Trading-The Need for Legislation, 10 SEC. REG. L.J.
350, 370-71 (1983) (the authors give a synopsis of the ALI code provisions dealing with
insider trading and damages). Concern was also expressed as to the effect any defini-
tion would have on other federal securities laws. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
See also House Hearings, supra note 13, at 278-83 (statement of Arnold S. Jacobs)
("Hundreds of cases clarify Rule 10b-5's insider trading prohibition.... Even if H.R.
559 were redrafted to include [a definition of insider trading] it is highly probable
that [it] would become the definition for all purposes of the federal securities laws.").
The Committee concluded that since judicial decisions over the years have been
sufficiently clear in developing the scope of insider trading liability, the courts are
well suited to continue this task. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13, 27, 32. But
see Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 224 (insider trading is currently not well defined);
Freeman, The Insider Trading Sanctions Bill-A Neglected Opportunity, 4 PACE L. REV.
221 (1984) (calling for the broadening of the class of prohibited conduct, and the clarifica-
tion of the liability of outsiders who engage in insider trading). Further, the Commit-
tee deferred to the SEC's broad rule-making authority to respond to any adverse
market developments. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
There were several other issues debated during the introduction of H.R. 559
(Senate version, S.910). Issues receiving the most attention were: secondary liability,
definition of profit and loss, statute of limitations, burden of proof, jury trial, and
insider trading definition. For an elaboration on these issues, see generally HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 1; House Hearings, supra note 13; Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1983; Hearings on H.R. 559 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs United States Senate, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
19. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983); Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381 (1982); Lorillard
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Current judicial construction of insider trading liability under
Rule 10b-5 is primarily influenced by two prominent United States
Supreme Court decisions: Chiarella v. United States"0 and Dirks v.
SEC.' In these two cases, the Supreme Court has taken a restrictive
approach in interpreting the substantive provisions of Rule 10b-5.22
If the Supreme Court and the lower courts further limit the scope
of insider trading liability, the deterrent impact of the ITSA may
decrease accordingly.13 Moreover, if the scope of insider trading lia-
bility is in any way modified as a result of the ITSA, it will be con-
trary to legislative intent.24 Courts may be faced with the dilemma
of whether to uphold the ITSA's deterrent objective by imposing a
severe treble damage penalty, or whether to avoid Draconian results-
where imposition of potential penalties may be overly harsh- by
restricting the scope of insider trading law.
Contrary to legislative choice, courts in other areas of the law
have not been steadfast in maintaining the independence between
these Draconian results and the application and interpretation of the
underlying substantive law.25 For example, the impact of overly harsh
results on the underlying substantive law can be seen in section four
of the Clayton Antitrust Act 6 and in the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),27 two areas where private plain-
tiffs may seek a treble damage penalty.28 However, the ITSA differs
from these treble damage provisions in two respects. First, under the
ITSA, only the SEC is empowered to enforce the treble damage sanc-
tion; it is not available for private plaintiffs.' Second, unlike the anti-
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978); 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION S 49.09 (4th ed. 1984 rev.); Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1274; Note, The
Effect of Prior Judicial and Administrative Constructions on Codifwation of Pie-Existing
Federal Statutes: The Case of the Federal Securities Code, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 367
(1978).
20. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
21. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
22. See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1294; Note, United States v. Newman:
Misappropriation of Market Information by Outsiders, 3 PACE L. REV. 311, 322-25 (1983);
Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule lob-5 and Insider
Trading, 30 EMORY L. REV. 263, 266-71 (1981). Also, see infra notes 197-207 and ac-
companying text.
23. See infra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
24. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 114-15 & 144-58 and accompanying text.
26. 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1982).
27. 18 U.S.C. SS 1961-1968 (1982).
28. For development of the effect of the treble damage penalty in antitrust
and RICO, see infra notes 144-79 and accompanying text.
29. See Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A). Section 28(a) of the Ex-
change Act also provides that "no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 [1986], Art. 6
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trust and RICO treble damage penalty, treble damages under the
ITSA is discretionary in that the penalty may be imposed up to the
treble damage maximum; the maximum need not be sought in every
case."0 With these two differences, desired levels of deterrence may
still be achieved while maintaining an independence between the
penalty imposed and any effect it may have on the underlying substan-
tive law.
The purpose of this note is to illustrate the competing concerns
between a treble damage penalty as a deterrent, and the role of
substantive insider trading law, which is potentially influenced by
Draconian results, yet instrumental to the deterrent objective. Divided
into four parts, this note first sets forth the "substantive" provisions
within the ITSA's main sections and their relation to substantive in-
sider trading law independent of the Act. Second, this note introduces
economic concepts of deterrence and the relationship of deterrence
to substantive law by analyzing trends in antitrust, RICO, and federal
securities law. Third, substantive law aside, the discussion analyzes
the unique problems presented by treble damages as a deterrent when
imposed on an entity versus an individual under the ITSA. Finally,
this note recommends how the SEC and the courts should implement
the ITSA to achieve its congressional objectives.
I. SUBSTANTIVE LAW WITHIN THE INSIDER
TRADING SANCTIONS ACT
A. Substance versus Procedure
Even though the ITSA was not intended to define or create a
new body of substantive insider trading law, the ITSA does contain
a substantive aspect. As a result of Congress' unwillingness to im-
pose strict sanctions on every insider trading violation, 2 the ITSA
contains distinct classifications of substantive insider trading liability.
These classifications are derived from the specific wording of the Act
and the clarifications within its legislative history.' The specific wor-
under the provisions of this chapter shall recover . . . a total amount in excess of
his actual damages .... 15 U.S.C. S 78bb(a) (1982). Failure to amend this section
under the ITSA provides further evidence that the ITSA's treble damage provision
is not available for private plaintiffs. See Note, supra note 2, at 485.
30. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-9.
31. See infra notes 256-76 and accompanying text.
32. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-11.
33. The unusual nature of the ITSA's legislative history was explained by
Theodore A. Levine, a former associate director of the Enforcement Division at the
1986]
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ding of the ITSA imposes substantive limitations on an underlying
insider trading violation before the treble damage sanction may be
applied. 4 This specific wording, in turn, expressly incorporates
"clarifications" contained in the committee report accompanying the
legislation."5 The clarifications are for use as guidance in determining
what limitations should exist on conduct that will be subject to the
treble damage sanction under the ITSA.3 ' Despite congressional
recognition that the limitations and clarifications within the ITSA and
its legislative history are to be given interpretive effect, there is no
express recognition that these limitations and clarifications are
"substantive" law.
However, there are at least two reasons why certain provisions
within the ITSA can be considered substantive. First, the ITSA goes
beyond a mere substantive-procedural dichotomy. Where a sanction,
fixed in amount and application, is mechanically or automatically im-
posed upon an underlying substantive violation, the sanction is ap-
plied as a matter of pure procedure without a substantive decision. 7
Unlike a purely procedural rule, the ITSA requires that once a
substantive violation under Rule 10b-5 is found, a second substantive
decision must be made to determine if the violation is within the.
ITSA's limited scope of liability before assessing the appropriate
measure of damage. Therefore, the ITSA is a hybrid or procedural-
based substantive rule. 8
Securities and Exchange Commission. See Levine, Insider Trading Act Broadens En-
forcement Scope. Legal Times, Sept. 10, 1984, at 17, col. 4.
The House version of the bill (H.R. 559) was amended by the Senate and
then passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President.
In the absence of a report by the Senate Banking Committee or a House-
Senate conference report, Report No. 98-355 of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, as modified by explanations from D'Amato and
Rep. John Dingell (D. Mich.) govern the interpretation of the act.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1277-78; Note, supra note
2, at 469-70 (elaborating on the ITSA's legislative history).
34. See, e.g., infra notes 42-111 and accompanying text.
35. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1. "[Tlhe clarification made to the scope
of the persons liable for the penalty answers the definitional concerns of some com-
mentators." Id. at 14. "The Commission does urge that the legislative history of the
bill cite behavior to which the statute is not intended to apply." Id. at 31 n.55.
36. See id.
37. See Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited with Some Afterthoughts
on the Constitutional Problems of "Irrebuttable Presumptions," 30 UCLA L. REV. 189,
204 (1982).
38. See id. at 207 (distinguishing between two kinds of procedural rules and
substantive rules: core substantive rules and procedurally-based substantive rules, and
core procedural rules and substantively-based procedural rules).
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Second, instead of imposing a pure procedural rule which would
maximize accuracy, consistency, and expediency within the judicial
process, Congress in effect imposed substantive limitations in order
to protect values other than judicial predictability and economy. 9 For
example, one of Congress' primary concerns was the need to ensure
a sufficient level of culpability and deterrence through a combination
of substantive limitations and discretionary levels of punishment."
Cognizant of this and other values and concerns, Congress incorporated
substantive protections within the ITSA and chose not to mechanically
impose a mandatory treble damage sanction for every insider trading
violation.
The most interesting aspect of the "substantive" terms within
the ITSA is the effect they may have on substantive insider trading
law outside the ITSA. Many of the provisions and terms within the
ITSA are derived from and even refer to other areas of insider trading
law.41 It remains to be determined whether interpretation of these
terms will be instructive only in the application of the ITSA's substan-
tive provisions, or whether the substantive provisions within the ITSA,
as endorsed by Congress, will eclipse many provisions of current
substantive insider trading law.
B. The ITSA's "Substantive" Terms in Relation to
Insider Trading Law
The "substantive" clarifications and limitations within the ITSA
create a defined scope of insider trading liability distinct from insider
trading liability under other federal securities law provisions. The
ITSA amended section 21(d)(2) of the Exchange Act and distinguishes
between the liability of those persons most directly culpable under
section 21(d)(2)(A) and those excluded as a result of their vicarious
relationship under section 21(d)(2)(B) .4 The following is an analysis of
39. See id. at 205-06. The author theorized that defining fact categories and
remedy ranges reflected by congressional value judgments are characteristic of the
process of substantive lawmaking. Id. at 208. The ITSA does contain limitations on
the scope of liability, and the treble damage sanction is discretionary; therefore, the
ITSA as a sanction statute includes characteristics of substantive law.
40. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. Cf. Eichler v. Berner, -U.S.
.... 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2030 n.23 (1985) (accepting Congress' view in the ITSA that
derivative liability is not as culpable as the breach of duty which gave rise to the
liability in the first place).
41. See infra notes 42-111 and accompanying text.
42. 15 U.S.C. S 78u(d)(2) (Supp. II 1984). See also infra notes 42-111 and accom-
panying text analyzing liability and exclusions under these two sections.
Sections 21(d)(2)(A) and (B) provide in full as follows:
(2)(A) Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has
violated any provision of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder
by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material non-
1986l
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the interrelationship and effect these two provisions have on other
insider trading law.
public information in a transaction (i) on or through the facilities of a na-
tional securities exchange or from or through a broker or dealer, and
(ii) which is not part of a public offering by an issuer of securities other
than standardized options, the Commission may bring an action in a United
States district court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to im-
pose, a civil penalty to be paid by such person, or any person aiding and
abetting the violation of such person. The amount of such penalty shall
be determined by the court in light of the facts and circumstances, but
shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result
of such unlawful purchase or sale, and shall be payable into the Treasury
of the United States. If a person upon whom such a penalty is imposed
shall fail to pay such penalty within the time prescribed in the court's
order, the Commission shall refer the matter to the Attorney General
who shall recover such penalty by action in the appropriate United States
district court. The actions authorized by this paragraph may be brought
in addition to any other actions that the Commission or the Attorney
General are entitled to bring. For purposes of section 27 of this title,
actions under this paragraph shall be actions to enforce a liability or a
duty created by this title. The Commission, by rule or regulation, may
exempt from the provisions of this paragraph any class of persons or
transactions.
(B) No person shall be subject to a sanction under subparagraph (A) of
this paragraph solely because that person aided and abetted a transac-
tion covered by such subparagraph in a manner other than by com-
municating material nonpublic information. Section 20(a) of this title shall
not apply to an action brought under this paragraph. No person shall be
liable under this paragraph solely by reason of employing another person
who is liable under this paragraph.
The ITSA also adds sections 21(d)(2)(C) and (D) to the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
S 78u(D)(2) (Supp. II 1984). Section 21(d)(2)(C) provides:
For purposes of this paragraph 'profit gained' or 'loss avoided' is the dif-
ference between the purchase or sale price of the security and the value
of that security as measured by the trading price of the security a
reasonable period after public dissemination of the nonpublic information.
For elaboration on the ambiguities this language may create, see A. JACOBS, supra
note 17, at 422-27; Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1280. Section 21(d)(2)(D) provides:
No action may be brought under this paragraph more than five years
after the date of the purchase or sale. This paragraph shall not be con-
strued to bar or limit in any manner any action by the Commission or
the Attorney General under any other provision of this title, nor shall
it bar or limit in any manner any action to recover penalties, or to seek
any other order regarding penalties, imposed in an action comenced within
five years of such transaction.
The ITSA also amends several other provisions of the Exchange Act. Most
notably, under section 32(a) the criminal fine is increased from $10,000.00 to $100,000.00.
15 U.S.C. S 78ff (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). This increase was due to the fact that inflation
had diminished the deterrent impact of the prior fine. HouSE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 8. Other enforcement related provisions that were amended include SS 78c(a)(39),
78o(b)(4), 78o(c)(4), and 78t (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
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1. Section 21(d)(2)(A)
According to the first part of section 21(d)(2)(A), "[w]henever it
shall appear to the Commission that any person has violated any pro-
vision of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder... the Com-
mission may bring an action in a United States district court" seek-
ing the civil penalty.43 First, this vests the SEC with the sole authority
to bring an action seeking treble damages under the ITSA against
a "person" who "violates" an insider trading proscription. 44 Interpreta-
tion of the term "person" may be derived from section 3(a)(9) of the
Exchange Act's broad definition which includes "a natural person, com-
pany, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
of a government."45 Since Congress rejected the suggestion that the
word "violated" be modified by the word "willfully," 4 the penalty may
be invoked where a person has violated insider trading law under
the usual scienter standard. 4 The violation must be of "any provision
of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder"4 which refers to
insider trading provisions under the Exchange Act.49
For purposes of the ITSA, a violation of an insider trading pro-
vision must occur when "purchasing or selling a security while in
possession of material nonpublic information."' The terms "purchas-
ing," "selling," and "security" are not specially defined by the Act
and should be construed according to similar terms under Rule lOb-5.'
However, purchasing or selling "while in possession of' within sec-
tion 2(d)(2)(A) is specifically distinguishable from trading "on the basis
43. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A).
44. See id. See also A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 409 (a private party has no
standing to invoke the penalty for the government); supra note 29 and accompanying
text (the ITSA's treble damage provision is not available under a private right of action).
45. 15 U.S.C. S 78(c)(a)(9) (1982). See A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 409.
46. See House Hearings, supra note 13, at 196-203 (statement of Arnold S.
Jacobs, Acting Chairman, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, introducing
a letter from the New York Bar's Committee on Securities Regulation to Senator
Alphonse D'Amato and Congressman Timothy E. Wirth (February 14, 1983)); A.
JACOBS, supra note 17, at 409.
47. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 409. The "scienter" standard under Rule
10b-5 is defined as an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
48. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A).
49. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 410. See also Langevoort, supra note 2, at
1279 n.28 (noting that S 15(c) under the Exchange Act prohibiting certain broker-dealer
fraud could be covered as well).
50. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A).
51. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 410. For an elaboration on the derivation
of the definition of a "security" as interpreted by the courts, see 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGA-
TION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10b-S5 38.03 (2d ed. 1985 rev.).
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of" inside information, which implies an underlying motivational re-
quirement.52 At least for purposes of the ITSA's application, the mere
possession of inside information when trading is controlling.53 Also,
"material nonpublic information" is another phrase derived from
general insider trading law which is usually used when referring to
inside information useful to the decision-making process of investors.'
The type of transaction encompassed in the terms above is
limited in that the transaction must be one "(i) on or through the
facilities of a national securities exchange or from or through a broker
or dealer, and (ii) which is not part of a public offering by an issuer
of securities other than standardized options."5 Under the first limita-
tion, insider trading in an over-the-counter security (unless through
a broker-dealer) or a direct trade between a buyer and seller would
be exempt." Therefore, liability under Rule 10b-5 prohibiting insider
trading through the mails or interstate commerce57 is broader than
the ITSA's more limited requirement that the transaction occur on
an exchange or from or through a broker or dealer before the civil
penalty can be imposed. 8 The second limitation exempts a public of-
fering in which the issuer is selling securities. 9 But, even in this case,
52. Trading "on the basis of" inside information raises the question whether
liability exists only when possession of the information itself was the reason for trading
or whether an insider could claim as a defense that he would have traded anyway,
with or without the information. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1289-90; Langevoort,
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1982).
This distinction was presented in hearings before the House, House Hearings,
supra note 13, at 48-49, but the Act's language does not require trading to be "on
the basis of" inside information. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A). See A.
JACOBS, supra note 17, at 410-11.
53. The language of the ITSA and its legislative history imply a legislative
design to make mere possession controlling. Langevoort, supra note 2. at 1290. But
see Brodsky, supra note 17, at 939 (the "while in possession of" language may change
the causation standard, requiring the SEC to prove the trading was motivated by
the inside information).
However, this "mere possession" test has been criticized in that if improperly
interpreted, such test may be used in reviving the parity of information theory re-
jected by the Supreme Court, bringing in other securities statutes under the ITSA
contrary to Congress' intent, undermining the Chinese Wall protection under the Act,
chilling beneficial market activities, and changing the common-law definition of insider
trading. Note, supra note 2, at 493-97.
54. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 412-13. See also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining "materiality").
55. Exchange Act, supia note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A).
56. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 411-13.
57. 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1985). See supra note 14.
58. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 413.
59. See id.
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where standardized options' are offered, the transaction is still sub-
ject to the civil penalty." The inference to be drawn from these two
limitations is that the ITSA's deterrent objective is tailored toward
protecting the integrity of more impersonal markets. 2
Section 21(d)(2)(A) continues by providing that "the Commission
may bring an action in the United States district court to seek, and
the court shall have the jurisdiction to impose, a civil penalty." 3 This
provision should enhance the effectiveness of the SEC's settlement
procedures since it allows a court to impose a penalty when a defend-
ant consents without first finding a violation of insider trading law. 4
Otherwise, absent a defendant's consent or settlement agreement, a
court must find the prerequisite violation of an insider trading provi-
sion under the Exchange Act before application of the ITSA's provi-
sions can be considered. 5
Under the ITSA, a "person, or any person aiding and abetting
the violation of such person" shall be subject to the civil penalty.
This language essentially encompasses two classifications of substan-
tive liability which are subject to the ITSA's civil penalty. First, the
ITSA's treble damage sanction applies where violations are found to
be "direct."" Under the ITSA, persons (or persons on behalf of an
entity) in a position to direct a transaction and receive the benefits
from the trade shall be classified as "direct violators."6 The usual
insider trading case involves an individual insider who, by trading
on inside information for his personal account, becomes a direct
violator. 9 However, under the ITSA, direct violators may also include
60. An option, the right to buy or sell at a certain price, can come in many
forms, but those which are regularly traded on a national securities exchange are "stan-
dardized options." For an analysis of the various terms and forms associated with
options, see 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10b-5 S 38.03[p] (2d
ed. 1985 rev.).
61. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 414.
62. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1279; Note, supra note 2, at 478-79.
63. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A).
64. See A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 414. E.g., SEC v. Gaffney, 11984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,002 (S.D.N.Y. April 18, 1985) (without
admitting or denying allegations in the complaint, the defendants consented to an in-
junction, equitable relief, and civil penalties under the ITSA).
65. See A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 414.
66. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A).
67. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11.
68. Id. at 10.
69. A typical example of a primary or direct violation of insider trading is
where an individual is an insider-an officer, director, or employee of an issuer-and
breaches a fiduciary duty by trading on material nonpublic information. Cf. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
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employers, control persons, or a corporate entity when they direct
and receive the benefits from the trade while in possession of material
nonpublic information."0 Individuals or entities classified as direct
violators are primarily liable under the ITSA and subject to its tre-
ble damage sanction and other traditional SEC enforcement remedies.7'
The second category satisfying the substantive requirements of
the ITSA includes "tippers" -those who unlawfully tip inside infor-
mation to others who actually trade." "Tippee" liability was given
little consideration in the ITSA's legislative history, but a tippee may
be liable under Rule 10b-5 if he "misappropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s]
(1969) (not only are directors or management officers of a corporation "insiders" but
anyone in possession of material inside information is an "insider" and must either
disclose it to the investing public or abstain from trading or recommending the securities
concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed).
70. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11. The Committee, in clarifying enti-
ty liability, stated the following:
[Wihen a corporate entity itself is in reality the trader, it would not escape
liability under the bill. Thus, if the board of directors of a corporation,
while having material nonpublic information, directed an employee to trade
for the corporation's account, the corporation itself would be liable for
the penalty. In that situation, the corporation would not be an aider or
abettor, but would, in fact, be a direct violator who traded on the inside
information.
Id. The report also hypothesizes a scenario where senior management of a multi-service
brokerage firm trades for the firm account based on inside information from its in-
vestment banking department. Id. at 11. In such a situation, the firm would be liable
for the treble damage sanction as a direct violator. Id. The firm, in essence, directed
the transaction and received the benefit from the trade. In comparison, where only
an advisor, while in possession of material nonpublic information, directs trades on
behalf of an investment company, the advisor would be a direct violator and not the
investment company shareholders. Id.
The committee report further limits treble damage liability in a multi-service
brokerage firm where one employee possesses nonpublic information but another
employee, not knowing of the information, trades for the firm's account. Id. Under
this "Chinese wall" approach, the firm would not be liable for trades effected on one
side of the wall, notwithstanding the possession of inside information by firm employees
on the other side. Id. at 11, 28 n.52.
These provisions must further be reconciled with Exchange Act Release No.
19244, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,276, at 85,477 (Nov. 17, 1982) which adopts Rule
10b-18 providing a safe harbor from liability for manipulation under Sections 9(a)(2)
and 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder in connection with purchases
by a user and certain related persons of the issuer's common stock. However, this
safe harbor under Rule 10b-18 "confers no immunity from possible Rule 10b-5 liability
where the issuer engages in repurchases while in possession of favorable, material
non-public information concerning its securities." Id. at 85,478 n.5.
71. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-11.
72. Id. at 9.
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the information." 3 Under the specific "aiding and abetting" language
of the Act, 4 those who unlawfully tip information leading to a pur-
chase or sale would be subject to the treble damage sanction.75 Tip-
pers aid and abet a transaction when a tippee trades on the tipped
inside information."8 The penalty is imposed on those tippers as aiders
and abettors even though they themselves do not in fact trade. As
a substantive classification, tipper misconduct is also considered just
as culpable as other direct violations subject to the Act since without
their inside tip, tippee trading on inside information would not occur."
The effect of this aiding and abetting language is an express Con-
gressional endorsement of this type of liability which has yet to be
endorsed by the Supreme Court." This Congressional endorsement-
that judicial application of aiding and abetting liability will help achieve
the remedial purposes of securities laws8 °-implies this language may
be applicable to other areas of securities laws."
73. Eichler v. Berner, __ U.S. 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2630 n.22 (1985); Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14-15.
74. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A). Before aiding and abetting
liability under section 21(d)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act can be imposed, it should be
reconciled with the aiding and abetting exclusions under section 21(d)(2)(B). See infra
notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
75. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. The Committee report also gives
an example of aiding and abetting liability. Broker-dealers and their registered represen-
tatives who only execute trades for customers who are trading unlawfully are not
subject to the ITSA. See id. at 10. However, where a registered representative or
broker received inside information, then tipped a customer who traded, he would be
directly liable for the treble damage sanction (and other available remedies) as an
aider and abettor. Id. at 9.
76. Id. at 28.
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. See Eichler v. Berner, __ U.S.-,-, 105 S. Ct. 2622,2630 n.23 (1985).
79. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10: "The Committee endorses the judicial
application of the concept of aiding and abetting liability to achieve the remedial pur-
poses of the securities laws." citing at n.17: SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570
F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). See Brodsky, supra note 17,
at 939-40. See also Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 87 (1981) (noting that the Supreme Court has never
faced whether section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would support theories of secondary liability).
80. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
81. See A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 414-15; Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1286.
The concept of aiding and abetting liability under the ITSA and Rule lOb-5 are very
similar. See also 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION & PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10b-5 S 40.02 (2d
ed. 1985 rev.) (discussing aiding and abetting liability and its relation to Rule 10b-5).
But see Fischel, supra note 78, at 97-98 (arguing that since Congress made special pro-
vision for secondary liability in other securities statutes but not in section 10(b), a
statutory construction rationale often invoked by the Supreme Court, to impose second-
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When the direct liability rises to the level of the ITSA's substan-
tive requirements in order to invoke the penalty provision, "[tihe
amount of such penalty shall be determined by the court in light of
the facts and circumstances, but shall not exceed three times the profit
gained or loss avoided as a result of such unlawful purchases or sale.
' .. '" Very few guidelines were provided in the Act's legislative
history as to what facts and circumstances may be considered,' and
no provision is provided within the Act itself for clarification. However,
to guide courts in this determination, factors considered in other SEC
enforcement actions,' the other remedies to which a defendant may
be subject," and the level of culpability" may provide a general
framework. Other factors may include the defendant's financial
resources and level of sophistication. 7 Calculation of the "profit gained
or loss avoided" is measured under section 21(d)(2)(C)8
As to who is subject to the penalty calculation, some dispute
may exist as to whether the treble damage penalty is the maximum
to be imposed on a single transaction even though involving multiple
offenders or whether each offender is separately subject to the tre-
ble damage penalty." A literal construction of the language implies
ary liability under section 10(b) would disrupt the legislative scheme). If secondary
liability, e.g. aiding and abetting, was not a viable theory under section 10(b) prior
to the ITSA, congressional recognition of this form of liability under the ITSA may
be an instance where it will impact substantive law outside the Act, i.e. section 10(b).
82. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A).
83. The committee report only indicates the level of a defendant's awareness
and the amount of proof demonstrated by the SEC as factors. HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 9.
84. For example, in considering whether to impose an injunction on an SEC
enforcement action, courts have considered the past conduct of the defendant, the nature
of the violation, whether or not and under what circumstances the defendant ceases
his insider trading, whether the defendant disclaimed an intent to violate the insider
trading provisions in the future, the defendant's opportunity to commit future breaches,
whether the defendant admitted guilt, whether the defendant reimbursed the victims,
and equitable and policy considerations. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 415. See also
A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at S 261.02.
85. Other liability remedies may include: recovery in a private right of action
under the federal securities law, common law, state blue sky laws; civil or criminal
RICO; disgorgement of profits in an SEC enforcement action; recovery by or on behalf
of the issuer under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act if the offending purchase and
sale by an insider can be matched against another sale or purchase within a six-month
period; administrative sanctions imposed by the SEC; and any jail sentence or fine
meted out as a criminal penalty. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 415-16.
86. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9; Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1278.
Other circumstances may include whether the defendant consented to the civil penalty,
and if he did, to what amount did he and the SEC agree as to the size of the penalty.
Regarding aiders and abettors, consideration may be given as to whether or not they
received any benefit from the insider trading and how close they were to the heart
of the violation. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 416.
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one penalty: "a civil penalty to be paid by such person or any person
aiding and abetting the violation" and "the amount of such penalty
.... shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided
.... 90 However, the legislative history and the underlying deter-
rent objective suggest each violator in an insider trading transaction
should be subject to treble damages.'
The rest of this section does not contain any controversial or
ambiguous wording. The penalty "shall be payable into the Treasury
of the United States," and if it is not paid within the time provided
by the court, the SEC "shall refer the matter to the Attorney General
who shall recover such penalty in the appropriate United States
district court."92 The SEC or the Attorney General is not preempted
from bringing any other action or actions by reason of this Act.9 3 An
action under this section is independent from any other remedy, and
it may be either the sole remedy or enforced cumulatively. 4 Section
27 of the Exchange Act pertaining to jurisdiction and service also
controls under this portion of the Act. 5 Finally, if the SEC so desires,
it may "by rule or regulation . . . . exempt from the provisions of
this [particular section] any class of persons or transactions.""
2. Section 21(d)(2)(B)
This section is another limitation within the ITSA which exempts
three classes of potential defendants from liability under the Act. First,
"[n]o person shall be subject to a sanction under [section 21(d)(2)(A)]
solely because that person aided and abetted a transaction covered
by such subparagraph in a manner other than by communicating
87. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1278.
88. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(C). See supra note 42.
89. See A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 416-17.
90. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A).
91. "[Playment of a civil penalty by any person does not extinguish the liability
of any other person .... The Commission may, in its discretion, seek a penalty from
any or all persons covered by this provision." 130 CONG. REC. H7758 (daily ed. July
25, 1984) (statement by Rep. Dingell), cited in Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1278. See
also A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at n.53 & text (noting ambiguity between the Act's
language and other parts of the legislative history).
92. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A).
93. The Act provides: "The actions authorized by this paragraph may be
brought in addition to any other actions that the Commission or the Attorney General
are entitled to bring." Id.
94. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 20-21. See A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at
418.
95. 15 U.S.C. S 78aa (1982); 15 U.S.C. S 78u (Supp. I 1984); A. JACOBS, supra
note 17, at 418.
96. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(A).
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material nonpublic information."'' In contrast to the aiding and abetting
liability under section 21(d)(2)(A), as long as a person does not com-
municate material nonpublic information, that person cannot be sub-
ject to the civil penalty solely as an aider and abettor." For example,
"tippers" could violate the Act under section 21(d)(2)(A) by aiding and
abetting when a tippee trades, but the broker who only executes the
trade and does not "tip" the information may be exempt under sec-
tion 21(d)(2)(B) even though he knowingly aided and abetted the trans-
action.9 This section does not necessarily insulate a line or succes-
sion of intermediate tippers who aid and abet the transaction when
they communicate material nonpublic information and others trade
on that information.' However, it may still be unclear the extent
to which an aider and abettor may exempt himself or even his firm
from liability based upon further use of the information gained through
executing a transaction, and the level of knowledge as to its inside
character.'0 '
Second, section 20(a) of the Exchange Act dealing with control
persons does not apply to an action brought under the ITSA. 1° In
other words, when someone is liable and subject to the civil penalty,
the control person responsible for the actions of the violator is not
liable under the Act merely because of his control person status."3
However, as this provision envisions the interrelationships between
a firm and its employees, it brings into question whether senior
management may incur liability for the inadequate supervision of its
employees.""
97. Id. at S 21(d)(2)(B).
98. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 418-19.
99. See Brodsky, supra note 17, at 939-40. But cf. HOUSE REPORT, supra note
1, at 28. An example in the Committee report implies an exception to the general
rule that the ITSA only applies to those who trade or tip others who trade. Where
a registered representative knew or should have known that a customer was trading
on inside information, he may be liable as an aider and abettor for up to three times
the customer's profits regardless of whether he tipped or traded. Id.
100. See A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 419.
101. See Brodsky, supra note 17, at 940.
102. The Act provides: "Section 20(a) of this title shall not apply to an action
brought under this paragraph." Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(B). See
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-10.
103. A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 419.
104. See Brodsky, supra note 17, at 940. The committee report notes that "[a]
broker-dealer or person associated with a broker-dealer who fails reasonably to super-
vise another person committing a violation may also be subject to the broad range
of Commission administrative remedies." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. But cf.
Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1282 n.44 (the ITSA exempts controlling persons whose
only role in the impropriety was a failure to supervise).
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Third, no person shall be liable for the civil penalty "solely by
reason of employing another person who is liable under this
paragraph."'0 5 This provision is primarily concerned with exempting
an employer-entity from respondeat superior liability if its employee
or agent violates the law.'"" However, the ITSA does not specifically
address the extent to which the knowledge of an employee or agent
is imputed to the entity which may, in turn, subject the entity to
direct liability. ' ' The legislative history expresses an intent to except
from liability the situation in a multi-service brokerage firm where
one employee may possess material nonpublic information but another
employee, not knowing of the information, trades for the firm's
account."' Under this "Chinese Wall" approach, the firm would not
be liable for trades effected on one side of the wall, notwithstanding
the possession of inside information by firm employees on the other
side.' 9
The significant effect of the provisions within section 21(d)(2)(B)
is express congressional recognition that aiding and abetting, control
person, and respondeat superior liability have applicability in federal
securities law."0 Indeed, while each provision under section 21(d)(2)(B)
is an exemption from the ITSA's civil penalty, Congress intended that
the aiding and abetting, control person, and respondeat superior
theories of liability continue to be subject to other SEC enforcement
actions."'
With the distinct culpability requirements, limitations, and
exemptions of the ITSA, the ultimate scope of liability subject to the
105. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 21(d)(2)(B).
106. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-10. See also Langevoort, supra note
2, at 1282-83 (provision designed to assure that the SEC does not use common law
doctrine of respondeat superior to circumvent exemption under section 20(a) of Ex-
change Act).
107. See A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 419-22.
108. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. But see Brodsky, supra note 17, at
940 (concern that the Act does not go far enough to exempt all section 20(a) and
respondeat superior liability especially based on inadequate supervision).
109. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 11, 28 n.52.
110. See A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 421-22. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1283;
Note, supra note 2, at 492-93.
111. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10, 17, 27. But cf. Fischel, supra note 79,
at 82 (concluding that the theory of secondary liability, unless expressly prohibited
by statute, is no longer viable in light of recent Supreme Court decisions strictly in-
terpreting the federal securities laws). The explicit statutory recognition of the
respondeat superior theory of secondary liability, in addition to section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, should resolve any doubts as to the viability of the common-law doc-
trine, but may raise new questions as to other employment related or other common-
law derivative liability. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1283.
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Act's treble damage provision is left to the interpretive discretion
of the courts. This discretion is dependent upon both the legislative
intent underlying the ITSA and current trends in judicial interpreta-
tion of inside trading liability under Rule 10b-5. In addition, courts
must now combine these factors and implement a sanction, up to a
discretionary treble damage amount, to effectively deter insider
trading.
II. DETERRENCE, TREBLE DAMAGES, AND THEIR RELATION
TO SUBSTANTIVE LAW
As the foregoing sections indicate, there is a dual objective im-
plicit within the ITSA. First, the primary objective of the ITSA's tre-
ble damage penalty is to deter insider trading. Deterrence is not only
a function of the severity of the sanction,112 it may also be a function
of the substantive law itself.' 3 Second, the ITSA is not intended in
any way to change the substantive law of insider trading. However,
as the preceding analysis indicates, many of the "substantive" provi-
sions within the ITSA itself may effect interpretation of other
securities laws independent of the ITSA. Furthermore, while contrary
to legislative intent, courts in other areas of the law have restricted
the scope of liability to avoid Draconian results when faced with im-
posing a severe sanction."4 This conflict is particularly evident in the
112. See infra notes 118-25, 235-36 & 250-51 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Lennon v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187,
193 (2d Cir. 1975) (deportation is not a penal sanction "[b]ut in severity it surpasses
all but the most Draconian criminal penalties . .. [and] harsh sanctions should not
be imposed where moral culpability is lacking"); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 242 (2d Cir. 1974) (expressly noting the concern for possi-
ble Draconian liability, the court suggested that the trial court might find that the
nature of the violations "may require limiting the extent of liability,"); Coffee, Cor-
porate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanc-
tions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 422 (1980) (discussing an economic theory of criminal
sanctions, the author notes the relationship between "traditional elements of economic
analysis (such as uncertainty) and non-economic factors that are deeply embedded in
the structure of our criminal justice system (such as the tendency toward nullification
of extreme penalties)."); Lamber, Private Causes of Action Under Federal Agency Non-
discrimination Statutes, 10 CONN. L. REV. 859, 888 n.150 (1978) (noting that because
of the "extreme and harsh" nature of a fund cut-off sanction, HEW had terminated
funding for only three educational institutions in 14 years).
As a general rule, even when remedies explicitly created by Congress may lead
to unusually harsh results, the judiciary is not at liberty to modify the remedies. See,
e.g.. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) ("The ultimate question
is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can im-
prove upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law."). But cf. Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Com'n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 626-27 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
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effect a mandatory treble damage sanction has had on the underlying
law in the area of antitrust."' While RICO suffers from a similar ef-
fect, court adherence to legislative intent indicating broad application
of RICO's flexible provisions has reinforced viability of express private
treble damage recovery for federal securities law violations, including
insider trading."' Now, with the enactment of the ITSA's treble
damage sanction at a time when the Supreme Court is already restrict-
ing the scope of insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5,"7 the threat
is real that courts may be tempted to further restrict liability to avoid
harsh results at the expense of added deterrence, which is contrary
to legislative objectives.
A. The Economics of Deterrence
Modern economic theory has postulated how optimal levels of
deterrence can be achieved through various forms and severity of
punishment. Deterrence is a function of the expected punishment,
which is a product of both the perceived probability and severity of
punishment."8 By increasing one factor, for example the severity of
punishment, the overall level of deterrence should increase."9 This
increase in deterrence is not without limit. When the severity of
punishment is increased to an extreme level, only marginal or
diminishing levels of deterrence will result. ° An increase in the
severity of punishment combined with an increase in the perceived
probability of punishment would yield higher levels of deterrence."'
Not only is deterrence limited by its optimal levels, it is also
limited by the level of risk an insider is willing to assume.'22 The
general theory is that the rational insider is normally a "risk averter"
and will therefore be deterred by the threat of severe punishment
(arguing that the statutory sanction of a fund cut-off is "too Draconian to be widely
used.").
115. See infra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 158-79 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 180-207 and accompanying text.
118. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 463 (2d ed. 1977); Stigler, The Op-
timum Enforcement of Laws, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
55-57 (1974); Dooley, supra note 2, at 25-26.
119. See Stigler, supra note 118, at 55-57; Dooley, supra note 2, at 25-26.
120. See R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 463; Stigler, supra note 118, at 55-57;
Dooley, supra note 2, at 25-26. Cf. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES:
A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 131 (1976) (objections to a fine oriented system only
indicate that there is some ceiling above which fines should not go).
121. See R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 463; Stigler, supra note 118, at 55-57;
Dooley, supra note 2, at 25-26.
122. See Coffee, supra note 114, at 428-33.
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alone."3 On the other hand, if the individual is a "risk taker" and thus
more prone to take risks because of collusion within a group,'24 deter-
rence could better be achieved by increasing the probability of punish-
ment."'
The perceived probability of punishment is a function of the
resources devoted to detection and apprehension of those who violate
the law. 2 ' However, the ITSA's treble damage sanction represents
a compromise reached by Congress to increase deterrence at minimum
government cost. Budgetary constraints have caused the SEC's en-
forcement resources to decline over the years.'27 Therefore, the most
cost efficient way to achieve the greatest level of deterrence is to
enact a severe penalty instead of more rigorous law enforcement.'28
Even though less cost efficient, the ITSA could yield higher levels
of deterrence with an increase in resources devoted to enforcement.
123. See id. at 433.
124. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as "risky shift." Coffee, "No
Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Cor-
porate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 390 (1981); Coffee, supra note 114, at 433.
125. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 120, at 118; Note, supra note 2, at
490-91.
126. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 120, at 118; Ehrlich & Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 275-77 (1974); Note,
supra note 2, at 490-91.
127. Even though the SEC has given priority to prosecuting insider trading,
see Thomas, supra note 4, at 435; Note, supra note 2, at 466-67, it has done so with
a concurrent decrease in the amount of resources allocated to enforcement. See HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. "In recent years, the securities markets have grown
dramatically in size and complexity, while the Commission enforcement resources have
declined. The level of Commission resources allocated to enforcement has dropped 11%
from 1979 levels." Id.
128. Coffee, supra note 114, at 421; Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar
Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 (1980).
Even though the ITSA's treble damage award is not available for private plain-
tiffs, private enforcement can add deterrence without any additional cost to the govern-
ment. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 30-44 (1975) (economic analysis of the benefits derived from the division of respon-
sibilities between public and private enforcers); Note, The Role of Treble Damages, supra
note 1, at 1086 (noting the SEC's position that private enforcement adds supplemental
deterrence to insider trading). But cf. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER. ANTITRUST LAW S
331(b) (1978) (government enforcement is preferable to private enforcement because
of "unfairness" to defendants, and discretionary trebling is proposed to remedy un-
fairness); Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble Damage
Antitrust Action, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 17, 25-52 (1983) (public and private antitrust
enforcement may be less "efficient" than a fine system enforced only by government);
Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for
Treble Damages, 17 J. LAW & ECON. 329, 347 (1974) (private enforcement spawns
nuisance suits and in terrorem suits).
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The perceived probability of punishment and the level of deter-
rence are also increased when a prohibition is made more specific.'29
Within the probability and severity deterrence formula, the probability
of punishment is determined by the level of resources devoted to ap-
prehension and conviction, and the burden of proof required to con-
vict. 3 ' By specifying the prohibited conduct more exactly, a statute
lightens the prosecutor's burden of proof and makes conviction
easier.'31 Easing the ability to convict or punish raises the perceived
probability of punishment and overall level of deterrence.'32
Further deterrence can be achieved indirectly through other
changes in the substantive law. Increasing the number of plaintiffs
who may sue, for example, by loosening standing requirements or class
action certification, may increase detection and possible punishment
of those who violate the law.133 While this may be applicable under
the express private right of action to sue for treble damages under
antitrust law'" or RICO,' 3 the ITSA vests only the SEC with stan-
ding to enforce the Act's trebling provision.'39
Another way substantive change can add to deterrence is by
broadening the scope of liability under a particular substantive provi-
sion, thereby increasing the number of defendants who may be sued.'37
For example, relaxing a knowledge requirement or extending a duty
subjects more acts to liability and increases the perceived probability
of being punished. While various forms of expanding the plaintiff class
or the defendant class may often overlap, the effect is that substan-
tive change can increase or decrease deterrence.
129. See R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 424-25; Ehrilch & Posner, supra note
126, at 275.
130. See R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 424-25; Ehrilch & Posner, supra note
126, at 275-77.
131. See R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 424-25; Ehrilch & Posner, supra note
126, at 276.
132. See R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 424-25; Ehrilch & Posner, supra note
126, at 275-77.
133. See generally, K. ELIZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 120, at 65 (noting
several ways to indirectly increase antitrust damages: "easing the burden of proof
of damages, enlarging the class of potential plaintiffs, lengthening the statute of limita-
tions on such suits, facilitating the assembling of potential plaintiffs, and permitting
consent decrees and pleas of nolo contendere to serve as prima facie evidence of guilt
in private damage suits."); Breit & Elzinga, supra note 128, at 346 (same).
134. 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1982).
135. 18 U.S.C. S 1964(c) (1982).
136. See supra notes 29 & 44 and accompanying text.
137. Cf. Note, The Role of Treble Damages, supra note 1, at 1086 (noting the
Supreme Court's trend in restricting fiduciary duties among defendants frustrates
private enforcement and its deterrent potential).
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The uncertainty and changes in the substantive law may,
however, also chill legitimate investments, adversely effecting the
efficiency of the national securities markets." Some legitimate invest-
ment may be deterred to the exteht investors are unsure of the scope
of acceptable conduct, especially in light of the threat of a severe sanc-
tion.139 Because the ITSA lacks a definition of insider trading, some
concern was expressed in the House hearings that a case-by-case ap-
proach would be unsuitable for such a drastic penalty. 40 However,
Congress expressed an intent that courts should avoid using the ITSA
to inhibit valid research efforts necessary to market efficiency."'1 Con-
sistency in interpreting insider trading prohibitions in order to main-
tain a status quo common law definition would add certainty to the
perceived probability of punishment and overall level of deterrence
while decreasing the chilling effects on legitimate investment and
market efficiency.
Since Congress chose not to specifically define insider trading,
but instead endorsed an amalgamation of court decisions,"z the breadth
of liability deterred by the ITSA will depend in part on current trends
in judicial interpretation of insider trading under Rule 10b-5. As an
analogy, judicial trends in the areas of antitrust law and RICO reveal
the effect a mandatory treble damage sanction under private enforce-
ment can have on the underlying substantive law.4 3 These provisions
differ from the ITSA which has a discretionary treble damage sanc-
tion available only under public enforcement of the SEC; nevertheless,
these judicial trends are instructive.
138. See Note, supra note 2, at 490 n.278.
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 13, at 106-07, 122-23, 149-51.
141. In clarifying Senate amendments to the ITSA the following explanation
was given of the Senate's consideration of an insider trading definition:
We anticipate that the courts in applying Section 10(b) of the Act and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder will be mindful of the necessity, in light of the
substantial penalty herein imposed, to avoid unduly inhibiting traders from
generating and acting upon valid research information of the sort upon
which efficient markets necessarily depend.
130 CONG. REC. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
However, this langauge was criticized as tempting courts to create a safe harbor
for financial or securities analysts in cases where protection should not be given.
Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1293-94.
142. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-15.
143. Analogy to antitrust law has been used to interpret the RICO treble
damage clause. See Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D.
Cal. 1982). See infra notes 144-79 and accompanying text.
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B. Treble Damages Under Antitrust and RICO
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a mandatory treble damage
award to private plaintiffs who are injured in their business or prop-
erty by reason of an antitrust violation.' Conceived as a primary
means of ensuring antitrust compliance, private enforcement initially
was relatively inactive due mainly to widespread judicial hostility
toward the remedy. ' This inactivity shifted under the Warren Court,
which broadened many of the substantive provisions,'40 ultimately
leading to a sharp increase in private antitrust litigation.' However,
concerned that the treble damage remedy will inflict unintended harms
on defendants and society as a whole, current judicial interpretation
of the antitrust provisions under the Burger Court has been more
restrictive."'
Three major cases under the Burger Court have had substantial
impact on restricting the availability of the treble damage award. First,
the availability of large consumer class actions for alleging an antitrust
violation was severely restricted in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"9
when the Court held federal rule 23 required individual notice be sent
144. 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1982). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "[a]ny
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
145. Sullivan, supra note 128, at 18-19. The judicial climate manifested itself
by creating the in pari delicto defense, requiring a "public injury" as a part of a plain-
tiffs cause of action, and requiring a clear showing in proving the amount of damages.
Id. at 19-20.
146. Id. at 20-21. The Warren Court also curtailed such prior doctrines as the
in pari delicto defense and the "public injury" requirement. Sullivan, supra note 128,
at 21. Further, the Warren Court rejected the pass-on defense which would have per-
mitted a defendant to avoid liability on the theory that the plaintiff passed-on any
harm to purchasers in the form of increased costs. Id. at 20, 21 n.21 (citing Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., [3921 U.S. 481 (1968)). However, the Burger Court
denied the right of these "indirect purchasers" to bring a damage suit. Sullivan, supra
note 128, at 21 n.21 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)).
147. Sullivan, supra note 128, at 20, 21. See also Posner, A Statistical Study
of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 371 (1970) (providing empirical data
on the number of private antitrust cases over the years).
148. Sullivan, supra note 128, at 22-23. See Note, A Farewell to Arms: The Im-
plementation of a Policy-Based Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions,
72 CAL. L. REV. 437 (1984). See also L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
S 247, at 770-71 (1977) (judiciary has not been generous in construing section 4 of the
Clayton Act and has developed devices to limit availability of the treble damage remedy
and other equitable relief).
149. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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to all class members who may be ascertained through reasonable ef-
fort, and that plaintiffs must bear the cost of sending this notice.150
Second, in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,5' the Court
held that for plaintiffs to recover treble damages for an antitrust viola-
tion the injury complained of must be more than just "casually linked
to an illegal presence in the market;" plaintiffs must prove "antitrust
injury."'' 2 This antitrust injury test-an "injury of the type the anti-
trust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendant's acts unlawful"15 3-has been interpreted as a sort
of standing doctrine imposing a broad limitation on the kinds of in-
jury for which plaintiffs may recover treble damages under antitrust
law."M Third, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,'55 the Court held that
indirect purchasers could not recover treble damages on the theory
that overcharges paid by a direct purchaser to an alleged antitrust
violator were passed on to the indirect purchaser." The underlying
threat of this theory was the potential for "double liability trebled."' 
5
1
If only offensive use of the "pass on" theory were available, defen-
dants would be at risk to multiple liability. 5 '
While the treble damage provisions under antitrust law are in
many ways similar to treble damages under RICO, 59 courts have not
only refused to draw parallels between the substantive provisions for
the two Acts,"6 but judicial treatment of the RICO provisions have
150. Id. See Sullivan, supra note 128, at 22.
151. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
152. Id. at 489.
153. Id.
154. Sullivan, supra note 128, at 22 n.30; See also Note, supra note 148, at 468
(noting that the antitrust injury rule and the standing requirements allow judges to
inject their own views on the substantive antitrust law and the class of person sub-
ject to the treble damage remedy).
155. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
156. Id. at 736.
157. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 148, S 252, at 790.
158. 431 U.S. at 730.
159. See Long, Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws:
A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L.
REV. 201, 208-09 (1981); Note, A Day of Reckoning is Near: RICO, Treble Damages and
Securities Fraud, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1109-12 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Note, A Day of Reckoning is Near]; Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety
of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1109-14 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Civil RICO].
160. E.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356-58 (7th Cir. 1983) (Congress
enacted RICO to attack organized crime, not restrain competition), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1002 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1982) (rejecting ap-
plication of antitrust's restrictive standing, and noting Congress did not intend to limit
RICO to the antitrust goal of preventing interference with free trade).
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generally been less restrictive.'1 Defendants have continually at-
tempted to limit recovery by alleging several defenses, 2 most notably
a causation-standing requirement similar to one under antitrust law, 3
but most have failed under the courts' liberal construction of the RICO
provisions which are based on a legislative history indicating broad
and flexible application.' Even with the concern that certain construc-
tion may create "a runaway treble damage bonanza for the already
excessively litigious,"'" courts have generally deferred to congressional
intent and construed the provisions broadly.
The RICO provisions create an express private right of action
whereby a plaintiff injured in his business or property by a RICO
violation may recover treble damages and attorneys' fees.' In general,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that a person has invested in, control-
led, or conducted an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity. ' The statutory definition of a pattern of racketeering activity
under RICO consists of at least two violations of enumerated federal
or state crimes occurring within a ten-year period.'68 One of the crimes
161. See Note, A Day of Reckoning Is Near, supra note 159, at 1092; Note,
Civil RICO, supra note 159, at 1102-03.
162. Courts have rejected such arguments by defendants that there be an af-
filiation with organized crime, Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, 567 F. Supp.
1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); that ordinary securities fraud violations should not apply under
RICO because adequate remedies exist under federal securities laws, Schacht v. Brown,
711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); but see Noland v. Gurley,
566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1983) (accepting the argument); that RICO is only applicable
when it infiltrates legitimate but not illegitimate enterprises, United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576 (1981); that proof of an enterprise must be distinct from a pattern of
racketeering, Moss, 719 F.2d at 21-22; but see Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir.
1982) (requiring distinct, independent proof of each element); and that a private action
can proceed only against a defendant who has already been convicted of a predicate
act on RICO violations, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., __ U.S. .. 105 S. Ct. 3275
(1985).
163. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text; Note, A Day of Reckoning
Is Near, supra note 159, at 1109-12; Note, Civil RICO, supra note 159, at 1109-14.
164. See Note, A Day of Reckoning Is Near, supra note 159, at 1092; Note, Civil
RICO, supra note 159, at 1102,03. This liberal construction is not so surprising since
Congress included an express "liberal construction clause" which provides: "The pro-
visions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, S 904(a), 84 Stat. 947. See
Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities," 18 GA.
L. REV. 43, 46 (1983), reprinted in 1984-1985 CORP. PRAC. COMM. 503; Note, RICO and
the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980).
165. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1002 (1983).
166. 18 U.S.C. S 1961-1968 (1982).
1678. . S 1961, 1962 (1982).
168. Id.
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included within this definition of racketeering activity is fraud in the
sale of securities.'69 A "person" subject to liability for securities fraud
is defined to include not only an individual or informal group of in-
dividuals, but also a legal entity,"70 such as an investment firm or cor-
porate defendant, even though such "person" has no apparent con-
nection with organized crime.' With the liberal construction of RICO
by the courts, the express private right of action allowing treble
damages and attorneys' fees may potentially have far-reaching effects
on individual or entity liability under the federal securities laws.
While no plaintiff has yet recovered treble damages for insider
trading under RICO, three recent cases indicate that securities fraud
actions are likely to continue under RICO. In Moss v. Morgan Stanley,
Inc.,'72 the Second Circuit considered whether RICO is applicable to
ordinary securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.'
While the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the RICO claim
for failure to show the predicate violation of section 10(b), the court
disagreed with the district court which ruled that RICO does not en-
compass private actions for violations of securities statutes by ordinary
businesses.' Similarly, in Schacht v. Brown,"' the Seventh Circuit re-
jected the argument that a broad reading of securities fraud under
RICO would eclipse federal securities laws.' 6 The court, in deferring
to legislative intent, held that civil RICO is applicable in ordinary
business fraud cases.' Most recently, the Supreme Court in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc."8 continued to construe the RICO provi-
sions broadly, recognizing that the current statutory scheme permits
recovery for the predicate offense of securities fraud.'79 These deci-
sions imply that upon a proper showing of the necessary predicate
securities law violation, courts will impose treble damages under RICO
against an individual or entity defendant for trading on inside infor-
mation. The important parallel to be drawn between RICO and the
169. 18 U.S.C. S 1961(1)(D) (1982).
170. 18 U.S.C. S 1961(3) (1982).
171. Note, A Day of Reckoning Is Near, supra note 159, at 1092.
172. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
173. Id. at 20-21.
174. Id. at 12, 20-21. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.
N.Y. 1983).
175. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
176. Id. at 1353.
177. Id. at 1353-56.
178. __ U.S. __, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
179. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 3287. See also Task Force Report, supra note
2, at 224, 247 (recognizing the effect of this case for recovery of treble damages under
RICO).
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ITSA is that both treble damage provisions are dependent upon
judicial interpretation of the securities fraud provisions.
C. The Supreme Court's Restrictive Approach to Federal
Securities Law Violations
Recent Supreme Court decisions have conservatively interpreted
the broad anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5, thereby limiting the
substantive scope of liability.'" The Court has used substantive re-
quirements of standing,'1 intent,'82 and fiduciary relationship"3 as
means to narrowly construe Rule 10b-5 liability. The policy reasons
for strict construction emphasized by the Court include limiting the
growth of private actions,'" preventing vexatious litigation,' " and main-
taining principles of federalism. "'
The Supreme Court's conservative approach to Rule 10b-5 is ex-
emplified by three cases in which the Court imposed substantive
restrictions for practical policy reasons. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores,"' the Supreme Court imposed a "purchaser-seller" stand-
ing requirement for private damage suits brought under Rule 10b-5."
Concerned that vexatious litigation might result from allowing implied
private causes of action, the Court limited the scope of liability by
restricting potential plaintiffs to "those who have at least dealt in
the security."'" In another action for civil damages, the Supreme Court
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder"' held that conduct cannot amount to
fraud under Rule 10b-5 without "scienter.' 9' The effect of this deci-
sion precludes liability in private actions which are based on claims
of mere negligence.'92 In a third example, the Supreme Court in Santa
180. See Note, United States v. Newman: Misappropriation of Market Informa-
tion by Outsiders, 3 PACE L. REV. 311, 322-25 (1983); Branson, Discourse on the Supreme
Court Approach to SEC Rule lob-5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L. REV. 263, 266-71
(1981).
181. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
182. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
183. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
184. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
185. Id. at 740; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977).
186. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (citing Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)).
187. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
188. Id. at 736-37.
189. Id. at 747.
190. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
191. Id. at 193. "Scienter" was defined as "a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. at 193-94 n.12.
192. The question still remains as to whether civil liability can be based on
reckless behavior. See Branson, supra note 180, at 268.
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Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green19 a held that the mere breach of fiduciary
duty does not necessarily amount to a violation of Rule 10b-5 94 The
Court in Santa Fe also relied on federalism principles to support its
ruling. 95 As a result, the Court deferred the substantive decision to
the state courts by stating that the existence of a state law remedy
"while not dispositive" should be considered by lower courts before
entertaining a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.' These cases illustrate how
the Supreme Court, by imposing substantive restrictions on plaintiffs,
has limited the scope of potential liability under Rule 10b-5.
This- restrictive trend by the Supreme Court is also evident in
the substantive law of insider trading as developed in two prominent
cases interpreting Rule 10b-5. In Chiarella v. United States,97 the
defendant, an employee of a financial printer, traded on undisclosed
information of a prospective takeover bid that he deduced from
publication information received by his employer.198 The Supreme
Court reversed his conviction for willfully violating section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.299 Relying on notions of common law fiduciary principles,
the Court held that Rule 10b-5 does not create a duty to disclose in-
formation prior to trading without some pre-existing fiduciary duty
or other relationship of trust or confidence between a specific pur-
chaser and seller of the securities.0 0 Since the defendant in Chiarella
did not have a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff seller of securities, he
had no duty to disclose prior to trading on the inside information."'
The mere possession of undisclosed material information was not in
itself a violation of Rule 10b-5."'
The Supreme Court again limited the extent of fiduciary obliga-
tions under Rule 10b-5 in Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commis-
193. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
194. Id. at 473-74.
195. Id. at 478. For an analysis of the federalism issue as it relates to securities
law, see Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REV. 813 (1984); Kitch, A Federal Vision of the Securities Law,
70 VA. L. REV. 857 (1984); Gorman, At the Intersection of Supreme Avenue and Circuit
Street: The Focus of Section 10(b) and Santa Fe's Footnote Fourteen, 7 J. CORP. L. 199
(1982).
196. 430 U.S. at 478.
197. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
198. Id. at 224.
199. Id. at 225.
200. Id. at 227-28.
201. Id. at 235.
202. Id. Compare supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text regarding the ef-
fect the "mere possession" language within the ITSA.
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sion.0 3 In Dirks, the defendant was disclosing information in an at-
tempt to get the SEC and the Wall Street Journal to investigate what
he believed to be a fraud.2"' Dirks received this material nonpublic
information from insiders, and disclosed the information to investors
who traded in the shares of the expanding corporation. 5 The Court
in Dirks held that a tippee of inside information acquires no fiduciary
duty to a corporation's shareholders to abstain from trading, absent
a breach of fiduciary obligation by the insider who tipped the infor-
mation to him."0 The Court found that the tippers received no
monetary or personal benefit in revealing the information and
therefore did not breach any duty to the shareholders of their cor-
poration. 7 Requiring a derivative breach by the tipper-insider before
imposing liability on the tippee, the Supreme Court placed a further
substantive limitation on Rule 10b-5 liability.
This substantive limitation in Dirks was characterized by Justice
Blackmun in his dissent as engrafting a subjective limitation on the
scope of an insider's duty to shareholders because, as the majority
held, an insider is not guilty of breaching his duty if he does not have
the improper purpose of personal gain when relaying inside informa-
tion.0 0 Justice Blackmun found this improper purpose requirement
unacceptable as resting implicitly on considerations of economic
policy.0 0 According to Justice Blackmun, the majority justified their
decision because the general benefit derived from the violation of the
insider's duty to his shareholders outweighed the harm caused to those
shareholders. 10 The import of this economic analysis is that the benefit
conferred on society may be paid for by the losses caused to the
trading shareholders; in other words, the end justifies the means.2 1 1
This analysis suggests the Court may accede the merits of economic
theory as it applies to substantive insider trading law.
203. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
204. Id. at 648-52.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 661-64.
207. Id. at 665-67.
208. Id. at 668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Justices Brennan and Marshall joined
in the dissent).
209. Id. at 676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 676-77 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (citing Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule
14e-3, and Dirks: "Fairness" Versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW 517, 550 (1982);
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Produc-
tion of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 338).
211. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 676-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun notes
the majority also seems persuaded by the theory that insider trading brings relevant
information to the market (citing H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
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These economic considerations are important because they will
ultimately determine the role of the ITSA in the area of insider
trading law and deterrence theory. Under Justice Blackmun's
characterization, the majority limited the substantive scope of 10b-5
liability not on account of any threat of a treble damage sanction,
but on mere notions of social benefit outweighing private harm. Now,
with the ITSA and recent developments under RICO, the threat of
Draconian liability is a reality because a "person" could theoretically
pay sevenfold his gain for trading on inside information- mandatory
treble damages based on an express private right of action under
RICO, disgorgement of profits, and a maximum penalty imposed under
the ITSA's discretionary trebling.212 In order to avoid the potential
of a grossly disproportionate penalty, similar to the result in the area
of antitrust law, the Court could, for example, further limit the reach
of fiduciary obligation under Rule 10b-5 in the wake of Chiarella and
Dirks, or narrowly construe the ITSA to prevent "direct" liability
under its "substantive" provisions. As an alternative, and without
altering the underlying substantive law, harsh results may be
alleviated by imposing far less than the treble damage maximum.
However, courts must be aware that under both alternatives, Con-
gressional objectives of increasing deterrence under the ITSA without
affecting the substantive law of insider trading may be undermined.
III. DISCRETIONARY TREBLING AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS
Justice Blackmun's characterization of the majority's approach
in Dirks also gains importance under the ITSA because similar
economic policy justifications can be used to achieve optimal levels
of deterrence when imposing up to a treble damage amount based
on the facts and circumstances of each case. Indeed, deterrence theory
within an economic framework was even presented in the ITSA's
House hearings." 3 As noted above, deterrence is not only a function
of the perceived probability of punishment, it is also a function of
the severity of the sanction. 14 Through the ITSA, Congress armed
59-76, 111-146 (1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV.
547, 565-76 (1970), and a variant of this theory which postulates that insider trading
causes no harm at all to those who purchase from the insider). Dirks, 463 U.S. at 677 n.14.
212. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1281 (with disgorgement of profits
and treble profits as a penalty under the ITSA, RICO amounts to a "quadruple profits
sanction"); Note, supra note 2, at 471 (disgorgement and treble damages imposes civil
liability up to four times the profit gained).
213. House Hearings, supra note 13, at 236, 268-77 (statement of Ted J. Fiflis,
Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School).
214. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
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the SEC with a treble damage penalty, rather than an increased en-
forcement budget, as the primary means to deter insider trading.
A. Economic Considerations
If the ITSA's treble damage penalty is to prove effective, the
purpose or purposes of the penalty must first be identified before
an appropriate penalty amount can be determined and imposed.215 A
treble damage penalty normally provides two functions: a compensa-
tion function to victims or society and a deterrence function against
violators of the law."' However, the ITSA contains no direct compen-
sation function to victims or society,"7 since the treble damage penalty
is sought by the SEC as public enforcer, and any penalty imposed
under the Act is paid to the United States Treasury. While this form
of payment may provide indirect compensation to the government for
funding the SEC," 8 there is no indication of an express, or direct com-
pensation function such as a provision that the penalty imposed shall
go to a special fund or even SEC enforcement."9 On the other hand,
the ITSA's legislative history is replete with evidence indicating a
deterrent purpose.2 0 Further, frequent reference to consideration of
"culpability" within the legislative history22' connotes a deterrent ob-
jective.' Therefore, the ITSA's treble damage provision envisions one
primary or overriding purpose-deterrence.
From the viewpoint of economic theory, deterrence is often
measured in terms of cost, and is used to minimize the costs to society
215. See Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1455, 1461 (1979).
216. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 221 (1976); Diver,
supra note 215, at 1455-56; Note, The Role of Treble Damages, supra note 1, at 1082.
217. See Note, The Role of Treble Damages, supra note 1, at 1082-83.
218. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938) (compensation to
the government for its enforcement expenses is a legitimate objective of money
penalties); Diver, supra note 215, at 1456 (money penalties serve a "general" compen-
satory function by compensating "society" at large for a harm incurred from a viola-
tion or alternatively the penalties compensate the government for the enforcement
costs incurred).
219. Cf. Diver, supra note 215, at 1462 ("[A] provision that sums collected will
go into a special fund to be 'applied toward reimbursement of the costs of determin-
ing the violations and assessing and collecting such penalties,' may imply a compen-
satory purpose.").
220. See HOUSE REPORT. supra note 1; House Hearings, supra note 13; Senate
Hearzny,, supra note 18.
221. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
222. Diver, supra note 215, at 1462.
19861
Metzger: Treble Damages, Deterrence, and Their Relation to Substantive Law
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1986
608 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
as a result of aberrant behavior.' When a person violates the law,
he imposes costs on society equal to the loss created by the activity
itself, the cost of enforcing the prohibition, and the cost of imposing
and collecting the sanction including external costs.' Economic theory
has postulated that a fine multiplier which sanctions the violator with
a cost equal to the cost that his violation created for society would
yield an optimal balance.22 These theories have as a basis, without
accounting for risk preference, an assumption that a potential violator
will calculate the costs and benefits of an activity, and if the costs
exceed the benefits, he will not violate the law.22 If a sanction is set
too low, the potential violator may not be deterred-he will not be
motivated to minimize social harm-or society may be undercompen-
sated for the harm that does occur."' If a sanction is set too high,
the cost of imposing and collecting the penalty and related external
costs will increase-increasing net social loss 2"'-or behavior, illegal
or not, that produces a net social benefit may be discouraged.2
It must be kept in mind that while these theories seek to balance
the relative costs to achieve an optimal and efficient level of deter-
rence, implicit within the deterrent calculus is a compensation func-
tion which provides restitution for societal losses incurred." Addi-
tionally, this optimal level of deterrence is measured purely from an
economic efficiency viewpoint without consideration of whether there
is an express legislative purpose that a particular sanction should be
imposed in such a manner. Nevertheless, as the deterrent and com-
pensatory functions necessarily overlap to a certain degree,' an ef-
fective deterrent scheme with indirect compensation elements as a
by-product is desirable because it will help reduce the cost associated
223. See id. at 1463-64; Note, supra note 2, at 486-89. See generally Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
224. Note, supra note 2, at 486-87. For consideration of external costs, see in-
fra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
225. R. POSNER, supra note 216, at 221-27. See Note, The Role of Treble
Damages, supra note 1, at 1082.
226. R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 164-65; R. POSNER, supra note 216, at 221-24;
Note, supra note 2, at 486.
227. R. POSNER, supra note 216, at 221-22; Diver, supra note 215, at 1458.
228. Note, supra note 2, at 487. See Diver, supra note 215, at 1474.
229. R. POSNER, supra note 216, at 221-22; Diver, supra note 215, at 1458.
Indeed, had the ITSA been in effect at the time the defendant in Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983), decided to expose the fraud, he may have been deterred from
doing so, and society would have continued to absorb the fraud.
230. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 216, at 221 (compensatory function is subsidiary
since a well-designed system of deterrence would assure adequate compensation as
a by-product).
231. See Diver, supra note 215, at 1461.
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with enforcement and collection of the penalty. While the ITSA's
primary purpose is deterrence, the discretionary elements within the
Act's treble damage sanction may necessarily entail a balancing of
factors, including the relative costs and benefits to society, victims,
and violators.
When faced with the decision to impose the ITSA's treble
damage sanction, courts will encounter different costs and conse-
quences depending upon whether a corporate entity or an individual
is deemed a direct violator of the ITSA's substantive requirements.
The consequences of corporate entity liability are especially impor-
tant not only because of possible negative effects external to the cor-
poration,232 but also because of uncertainty as to the extent of cor-
porate and corporate management liability.233
B. Entity Liability
At the corporate entity level, the imposition of a severe penalty
on a corporation may result in several undesirable or unfair conse-
quences. First, where the expected gain exceeds the certainty and
costs of apprehension and conviction, the illegal act may not be deter-
red.134 When a severe money penalty is the chief enforcement tool
designed to counteract this expected gain, the full amount of deter-
rence is limited by the corporation's wealth or "ability to pay." '35 Any
penalty imposed above this threshold level of corporate resources fails
to add any further deterrent or punitive effect. 36 In addition, the
stigma or social opprobrium of an individual criminal conviction can-
not raise this threshold level of deterrence since the corporation as
a entity cannot, as yet, be convicted. 37 To the extent that other en-
forcement remedies are imposed with disgorged profits set aside for
232. See infra notes 238-48 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 43-111 and accompanying text.
234. See R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 165-67; Stigler, supra note 118, at 55-57;
Dooley, supra note 2, at 25-26.
235. Coffee, supra note 124, at 390. See Black & Lind, Crime and Punishment
Reconsidered, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 242-43 (1975).
The term "ability to pay" can have at least three distinct meanings: 1) the sub-
jective pain a sanction inflicts on the wrongdoer, 2) the practical ability of the govern-
ment to collect the debt, and 3) the hardship imposed on the wrongdoer or, second-
arily, on others as to warrant a sanctions reduction. Diver, supra note 215, at 1469-70.
See also Goldschmidt, An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money
Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 896, 946 (1972).
236. See Coffee, supra note 124, at 390. Professor Coffee labels this situation
a "deterrence trap." Id.
237. Id. at 389.
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private plaintiffs, or to the extent treble damages are imposed under
a successful RICO suit, the corporation's ability to pay and the ultimate
threshold level of deterrence is further limited. Therefore, where a
corporation is liable as a direct violator under the ITSA, the upper
penalty limit a corporation can absorb and still feel the deterrent im-
pact may in many cases be substantially less than the full treble
damage amount.
The imposition of treble damages under the ITSA on a corpora-
tion will result in both internal and external costs. When severe cor-
porate penalties are imposed to punish a corporation, the penalty cost
incurred by the corporation may be internalized and become a cost
of production.23 However, severe corporate penalties also spill over
and impose costs external to the corporation on parties less culpable
in the corporation's underlying offense. 39
Professor Coffee cites four areas where severe corporate
penalties are borne externally.24 First, stockholders bear the reduced
value in their securities which reflect the penalty incurred by the cor-
poration.241 Second, bondholders and other creditors also bear the cor-
porate penalties since their interests are ultimately associated with
a riskier corporation.242 Third, employees and the general public suf-
fer when penalties reduce corporate expansion or solvency, thereby
decreasing the level of full employment and minority recruitment.43
Fourth, the internal costs borne by the corporation may be exter-
nalized to the consumer in the form of higher prices, " at least up
to the extent the market will bear. Where a corporation's wealth is
limited or even diminishing and the external costs are high in pro-
portion to the internal costs of the penalty, any corporate liability
may result in negative consequences for many less culpable or inno-
cent parties. Due to the threat of Draconian liability in such a situa-
238. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 139 (noting that strict liability
may compel a firm to internalize all of its accident costs but leads to inefficient solu-
tions in conflicting resource use problems); Diver, supra note 215, at 1464 ("penalty
for violating a regulation serves as surrogate 'cost' of production-a way to internal-
ize otherwise external costs"),
239. See Coffee, supra note 124, at 401.
240. Id.
241. Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE S 2.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 423, 433 (1963).
242. Coffee, supra note 124, at 401. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Com-
ment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Kadish, supra note 241, at 433.
243. Coffee, supra note 124, at 401.
244. Id.
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tion,2 5 courts may narrowly construe the underlying substantive law
or impose a penalty so low that it jeopardizes potential deterrence,
both contrary to congressional objectives.
The externality problem, the uncertainty of the law, and the
threat of potential treble damages may also extort a settlement from
an otherwise innocent corporation. Economically, a corporation faced
with a lawsuit may determine that the benefits of a reduced settle-
ment cost outweigh the costs associated with an expensive and pro-
longed lawsuit to establish its innocence.2 46 This problem may be less
severe where the SEC acts as public enforcer."' However, the cor-
poration is still faced with the additional civil penalties that private
plaintiffs may recover in the event liability is found. While the use
of settlements may not affect the underlying substantive law of in-
sider trading, the uncertainty in the underlying substantive law as
well as uncertainty in the penalty amount may affect the decision of
whether to litigate or settle.4 1
C. Individual Liability
When imposing the ITSA's penalty to deter or motivate future
behavior, the economic considerations noted above suggest that sever-
ity of punishment is important in deterring prohibited conduct by both
corporate entities and individuals.149 Like a corporation, an individual
is also limited by his wealth or ability to pay in the event of civil
penalty."' Any penalty imposed above this threshold level will not
add any further deterrent or punitive effect.2 ' A person's ability to
245. See, e.g., Diver, supra note 215, at 1470 (not only is secondary unemploy-
ment as economic dislocation undesirable, where a penalty creates an "inability to
pay," then "its very Draconian character suggests that 'ability to pay' may -or should -
also include consideration of the welfare of the violator, either for his own sake or
for the sake of those dependent on him.").
246. Coffee, supra note 124, at 402. See also Note, Contribution and Antitrust
Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 890, 906 (1980) ("A Company faced with this massive liability
may have little choice but to settle and to surrender its opportunity to go to trial
on the merits of its case."); R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 434, 477 (discussing several
scenarios in the decision of whether to settle or go to trial).
For consideration of recent activity regarding the SEC's settlement process,
see generally Block & Barton, Contribution and Indemnification Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 11 SEc. REG. L.J. 351 (1984); Kronstein, SEC Settlements-Is There a
Need for a Judicial Rubber Stamp? 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 284 (1983).
247. See Coffee, supra note 124, at 403.
248. See Diver, supra note 215, at 1471-73. See generally D'Amato, Legal Uncer-
tainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983).
249. See supra notes 215-31 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
19861
Metzger: Treble Damages, Deterrence, and Their Relation to Substantive Law
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1986
612 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.20
pay is further threatened when profits are disgorged and he is faced
with potential liability under a RICO treble damage suit. Therefore,
an individual found liable under the ITSA may also be deterred by
a monetary penalty substantially less than the full treble damage
amount.
Nevertheless, severe punishment directed to deter individual
behavior is not fraught with all the problems associated with penalties
imposed on a corporation. Unlike a corporate entity, an individual can
be fined and imprisoned. 2" As a corollary, severe monetary penalties
coupled with the stigma of a criminal conviction can raise the in-
dividual's perceived cost of punishment to exceed the expected gain.2
The spill-over problems associated with external costs are not pre-
sent with individual defendants; however, since insider trading is not
clearly defined, and uncertainty exists as to the penalty amount, some
individuals may also feel similar settlement pressures." To the ex-
tent that the law and penalty are uncertain, an individual may be
deterred from engaging in questionable conduct, depending on his
degree of risk aversion. 5
IV. RECOMMENDED APPROACH AND ITS EFFECT ON ENTITY AND-
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY UNDER THE ITSA
A. A General Rule
Through the ITSA, the SEC and the courts have the ability to
achieve the dual congressional objectives of maximizing deterrence
without modifying underlying substantive insider trading law. Because
the ITSA's legislative history suggests an overriding deterrent pur-
pose, achievement of the ITSA's full deterrent potential mandates that,
as a general rule, the SEC seek the full treble damage maximum in
most cases.'- This would ensure that the ITSA's treble damage sanc-
252. Criminal prosecutions can be pursued under section 32 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78ff (1982), and under the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984 where the fine assessed against criminals was increased from $10,000
to $100,000. Exchange Act, supra note 10, at S 32(a), 15 U.S.C. S 78ff (Supp. 11 1984).
253. See Coffee, supra note 124, at 389, 409. However, since the treble damage
sanction, coupled with other remedies is so severe, it may be unlikely that the SEC
would seek both civil and criminal remedies. See House Hearings, supra note 13, at
70-71 (testimony of John M. Fedders, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC).
254. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 122-25 & 138-41 and accompanying text.
256. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1278-79; Block & Barton, Insider Trading
The Need for Legislation, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 350, 372 (1983).
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tion is perceived as a severe deterrent threat."7 Courts should only
allow mitigating circumstances to reduce this amount when necessary
to alleviate harsh results."8 When mitigating circumstances exist,
courts should incorporate the economic considerations discussed above
before reducing the penalty. Moreover, since the SEC in the past has
not always assessed the maximum available penalty in its settlement
process,259 this process should be monitored to ensure that a suffi-
cient level of deterrence is maintained and that penalties assessed
are consistent among similar types of violations.6 If most cases are
settled well below a defendant's threshold level of deterrence, the
perceived deterrent potential of the Act will be thwarted.
There are several ways the SEC and courts can maintain the
ITSA's objective of achieving deterrence without modification of
substantive insider trader law. The primary method would be for the
courts to consciously avoid taking into account the severity of the
ITSA's sanction or its substantive elements when determining whether
a 10b-5 violation exists. If a court finds that equity favors less than
treble damages, courts should not narrow the scope of liability under
Rule 10b-5; but rather, should resort to mitigating circumstances to
limit the amount of damages. The discretion given to courts in impos-
ing up to the treble maximum should be viewed as the sole means
of achieving equitable and economically efficient results in individual
cases. Another method by which the SEC can maintain the current
scope of insider trading law is through its rule-making authority."1
257. Cf. Diver, supra note 215, at 1483 (invoking the highest potential monetary
liability maximizes the likelihood that response to an assessment will be taken seriously
and expeditiously and may also strengthen the agency's bargaining position).
258. Block & Barton, supra note 256, at 372. Since the ITSA is a "variable-
penalty" statute, a decision-maker is empowered and implicitly directed to consider
mitigating factors when assessing the penalty, Diver, supra note 215, at 1444, and
it may even confer a broad range of discretion to settle cases. See id. However, "[mlitiga-
tion is an act of mercy, exceptional and dispensational: allowing the agency to grant
,anticipatory' mitigation permits the exception to swallow the rule." Id. at 1481.
Premature mitigation may result in excessive leniency due to initial lack of reliable
evidence of mitigating circumstances. Id.
259. See Dooley, supra note 2, at 12-13; Thomforde, Patterns of Disparity in
SEC Administrative Sanctioning Practice, 42 TENN. L. REV. 465, 486 (1975); Note, supra
note 2, at 468-69. Cf. Coffee, supra note 124, at 406 (Justice Department recommended
the maximum fine in less than a third of the cases where it obtained convictions);
Goldschmidt, supra note 235, at 919 (as of 1972, federal agencies settled 90% of the
cases by means of compromise, remission or mitigation devices).
260. See generally Diver, supra note 215 (recommending a monitoring process
by federal agencies to develop penalty standards).
261. For example, Rule 14e-3 was promulgated by the SEC in response to the
Supreme Court's decision rendered against it in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
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Since the Supreme Court has narrowed insider trading liability main-
ly by restricting the extent of fiduciary obligation, the SEC could pro-
mulgate rules clarifying the reach of fiduciary obligations, and make
those rules commensurate with the "direct" liability definition of the
ITSA's "substantive" provisions.
The SEC can also achieve optimal levels of deterrence by its
choice of what type of insider trading violations to prosecute. A temp-
tation may exist to concentrate on prosecuting only those cases which
could meet the ITSA's substantive requirements in an effort to ac-
tively deter insider trading.262 The SEC should be cognizant of this
temptation and not allow the ITSA to overshadow its other beneficial
enforcement remedies. Investigating cases involving secondary liability
through injunctions and disgorgement remedies will provide private
plaintiff recovery while maintaining a viable source of insider trading
law independent of the ITSA. Indeed, recovery under theories of
secondary liability should be pursued in light of recent congressional
endorsement of this type of recovery. If all insider trading cases are
brought under the more limited scope of the ITSA, court interpreta-
tion and application of the ITSA's substantive elements may become
the norm as an insider trading definition, thereby supplanting insider
trading as defined by prior court interpretations of Rule 10b-5. In ad-
dition, the use of criminal sanctions as an added deterrent should be
pursued as often as possible. This is especially important with respect
to individuals who, because of their wealth and reputation, stand to
lose more from a criminal conviction than from a severe monetary
penalty.
Finally, as analyzed above, deterrence may be increased by in-
creasing the perceived probability of punishment.263 Aside from inter-
nal efficiency and priorities within the SEC, the most direct way to
increase the threat of punishment would be to earmark the fines col-
lected under the ITSA for SEC enforcement of insider trading.264
However, while this may inject a direct form of compensation, the
222 (1980). See Heller, supra note 2, at 541 & n.58; Block and Barton, supra note 256,
at 365. The ITSA expressly defers to the SEC's rulemaking authority, permitting the
SEC to set the parameters of the Act's application. Exchange Act, supra note 10,
at S 21(d)(2)(A).
262. Cf. Note, supra note 2, at 467 (noting that faced with limited enforcement
resources, the SEC's "big bang" approach in prosecuting highly visible cases to max-
imize publicity and resulting deterrence).
263. See supra notes 118, 121, 126-28 and accompanying text.
264. See Note, supra note 2, at 491; Note, The Role of Treble Damages, supra
note 1, at 1083.
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overriding deterrent purpose of the ITSA should not be altered under
this proposal.
B. Difference in Application between Corporations and Individuals
Even with the above recommendations as general guidelines, it
must be remembered that their application to corporations and in-
dividuals is not the same. As previously noted, corporate punishment,
unlike individual punishment, may result in undesirable or unfair con-
sequences. 5 The decision to impose the treble damage sanction on
the corporation creates problems for the SEC and the courts due to
an inherent paradox. On the one hand, a severe penalty is the most
effective and cost efficient way to counter the disadvantage of the
SEC's limited resources and deter misbehavior."' On the other hand,
when corporations are involved, a rule imposing the maximum penal-
ty in every case may lead to undesirable or unfair results for several
reasons. First, since a corporation will only be deterred up to its ability
to pay, the threat of the treble damage maximum may have no ef-
fect." ' Second, the ultimate effect of the penalty may be felt by those
less culpable, or even worse, innocent investors because of a corpora-
tion's ability to externalize these costs."' Such a result would be con-
trary to the Act's goal of protecting innocent investors. Third, the
threat of a severe sanction may result in the unfairness of an ex-
torted settlement.6 9 These few examples illustrate some of the
negative consequences of corporate punishment.
In contrast, punishment of individuals, while sharing some of the
same problems as corporate punishment, is more effective in directly
deterring those responsible for the violation. When punishing in-
dividuals, the treble damage penalty may not deter beyond an in-
dividual's ability to pay, but the threat of losing one's economic base
is a severe deterrent in itself. Even though a corporate penalty suf-
fers from the same limitations, individuals are not able to externalize
their cost.- In addition, the perceived threat of a criminal prosecution
can raise the level of deterrence for an individual. 70
In view of the benefits of individual punishment over corporate
punishment, courts and the SEC could attempt to equalize these dif-
ferences by punishing the individuals responsible for the corporate
265. See supra notes 234-55 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
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wrongdoing, rather than punishing the corporate entity itself.
Punishing the individuals responsible for the corporate liability is con-
sistent with the ITSA's concept of direct liability. In theory, by
punishing the corporation, with the threat of a corporate fine suffi-
cient to deter, the corporation will institute internal controls on its
management and employees to prevent their misconduct for which
the corporation is legally responsible. 7' But, if liability is placed on
those responsible for the misconduct, the incarceration deterrent is
retained and the externality problem is prevented.2 This approach
may also quell some of the fears that the ITSA does not go far enough
in defining the breadth of the term "person" or protecting forms of
secondary liability. 7 Where a board of directors directs an employee
to trade for the firm's benefit using inside information, the entity is
liable for a direct violation under the ITSA. 7 ' However, the Act also
deems those who are in a position to direct a transaction and receive
the benefits of the trade to be direct violators."' Because it is actual-
ly the board members themselves who direct the trade, and they are
in a position, at least indirectly, to receive the benefits of the trade,
they should be held individually liable as direct violators.7
Despite the fact that the level of deterrence achieved through
the severe sanctions authorized by the ITSA is more problematic with
regard to a corporate entity than an individual, congressional objec-
tives can still be upheld in punishing a corporation, albeit to a limited
extent. Even though the rationale behind direct liability would sup-
port punishing corporate actors trading for the firm's account, the
legislative history suggests congressional intent to impose punishment
on the corporation itself. In light of this congressional choice, the SEC
and the courts should continue to strive for the maximum possible
deterrent by proceeding against corporations as well as individuals.
271. See R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 236; Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1285.
See also Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large
Corporation, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 1051 (1982).
272. See Coffee, supra note 124, at 408.
273. See Brodsky, supra note 17, at 940.
274. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
275. Id.
276. Cf. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (whether an insider breaches a duty
"requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct
or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputa-
tional benefit that will translate into future earnings"). Board members essentially
tip information to the corporation and execute trades for it, and when a corporation
trades on nonpublic material information which goes undetected and improves its finan-
cial position, board members reap, at least indirectly, part of the increased future
earnings and reputation.
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CONCLUSION
In response to the need for an enforcement remedy sufficient
to deter insider trading, Congress incorporated a severe treble damage
sanction into the ITSA. The congressional choice to enact a sanction
statute imposing a severe deterrent was not in any way intended to
affect judicial interpretation of the underlying substantive law. As
a result of the severity of the treble damage sanction and the cur-
rent trend of Supreme Court decisions narrowing the scope of liabili-
ty under Rule 10b-5, the congressional objectives to deter without
modifying substantive law may be jeopardized by courts trying to
alleviate Draconian results. In spite of the differences the ITSA's tre-
ble damage sanction creates when applied to corporations and in-
dividuals as direct violators, the SEC and the courts can still uphold
the congressional objectives of the Act without compromising the
underlying substantive law by consistently injecting the threat of a
severe sanction.
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